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Abstract
Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention: The Evolution of an Idea - This
paper traces the evolution of ideas about the relation between liability insurance
and accident prevention, from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present.
It shows how liability insurance was ﬁrst defended against the criticism that it
would reduce safety incentives, primarily on the ground that it would promote
the compensation of accident victims. It then reviews the evolution of these ideas
in the major debates about insurance and tort reform that occurred over the next
century and a half. What this review reveals is not a slow and steady evolution of
thought. It is instead a story of basic insights about the relation between liability
insurance and accident prevention that were recognized relatively early, but that
went essentially unappreciated and undeveloped over a period of many decades,
largely because there was such a heavy concern with the compensation of acci-
dent victims among those who thought and wrote about tort liability during this
period. Only when subsequent scholars and policymakers ceased arguing about
tort liability and its reform almost exclusively in social welfare terms and began
also to think of tort as the more complex and mixed system that it actually is, was
it possible for insights about the relation between liability insurance and accident
prevention to play a more signiﬁcant role than they had until that time. 
  1 
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION: 






The tort system has an ambivalent attitude toward liability insurance.  On the one 
hand, an insured defendant is more likely to be able to satisfy the full amount of a judgment 
against it than an uninsured defendant.  Liability insurance is therefore favored, because it 
facilitates the compensation of successful plaintiffs.  On the other hand, liability insurance may 
generate moral hazard, since other things being equal, insured parties are likely to be less 
concerned about the threat of liability than uninsured parties.  Liability insurance may thereby 
undermine accident prevention. For more than a century now this ambivalence has manifested 
itself in a variety of ways, in both judicial decisions and in debates about tort reform. 
This paper is about the way in which ideas about the relation between liability 
insurance and accident prevention have evolved, from the middle of the 19th century to the 
present.  These ideas are part of a larger story about the symbiotic relationship between tort 
liability and insurance during this entire period.  Much more is involved in this story than 
liability insurance and accident prevention alone.  Other forms of insurance, and other goals, also 
figure prominently.  And the story involves more than ideas.  The way in which tort liability and 
various forms of insurance have influenced each other in practice is a least as significant as the 
way that ideas about this relationship have evolved.  Nonetheless, ideas have consequences, and 
ideas about this relationship – including Guido Calabresi’s important ideas about it – have 
                                                 
* Copyright © 2004, by Kenneth S. Abraham.  Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Class of 
1966 Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.  I am grateful to my colleagues Vincent Blasi and 
G. Edward White for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.  Portions of the paper are part of a book I 
am writing about the influence of tort liability on the development of insurance, and the influence of insurance on the 
development of tort liability, over the last 150 years.  
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affected the development of the law for nearly two centuries now. 
The paper is being presented during a portion of the Conference devoted to 
Calabresi’s impact on the law and scholarship of mass torts. Although the influence of ideas 
about the relation between liability insurance and accident prevention on mass tort liability has 
been attenuated, toward the end of the paper I will try briefly to show that there has in fact been 
such an influence and that Calabresi’s writing figures importantly in that influence. 
When THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
1 was published, mass tort litigation was virtually 
non-existent, and the very idea of a mass tort was only beginning to emerge.
2  For example, the 
first appellate decision to recognize a cause of action for asbestos-related personal injury was 
decided in 1973,
3 three years after Calabresi’s book was published.  The other mass tort actions 
that we have now come to recognize as paradigms in the field came later that decade.  The first 
Dalkon Shield 
4 and DES actions
5 were filed in the mid-1970's, and the first Agent Orange 
actions were begun in 1978.
6  So it is no surprise that Calabresi did not expressly address mass 
tort issues in his book.  Indeed, the types of tort cases that were in the forefront at that time, and 
that the book can be understood to be addressing most concretely, involved automobile litigation 
and sporadic forms of products liability. 
                                                 
1See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970)(hereinafter 
referred to without citation as “THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS”). 
2See, e.g.,  Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story: An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 
CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968). 
3See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
4See In re A.H. Robins Co. Inc. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Products, 406 F. Supp. 540 (MDL 1975). 
5See generally Naomi Sheiner, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 
963 (1978). 
6See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 3 (1986). 
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But of course THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS is about far more than auto accidents and 
product-related injuries.  It is a view of tort liability for accidental injury as a whole, and of the 
other forms of injury prevention and compensation whose existence and character influence the 
ways we should think about the proper scope and functions of tort.  In that sense the book was as 
much about mass torts as it was about other, more traditional forms of liability for accidental 
injury.   
In view of what has transpired in tort law and tort litigation during the last thirty 
years, it is evident in retrospect that THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS was published at the beginning of 
a new era in the history of tort law – an era in which mass tort litigation figures prominently.  
The book constructed an intellectual and conceptual platform from which thinking about tort 
liability and new forms of tort litigation could develop.  In doing so the book brought together 
and advanced our thinking about two very different themes in the history of tort law and 
insurance:  accident prevention and loss spreading.  Once these themes were brought together, 
not only academically but also in practice, tort law thinking could never be the same again.   
To understand where Calabresi’s thinking fits in the history of ideas about the 
relation between liability insurance and accident prevention, I begin by examining the way that 
the courts thought about insurance and accident prevention in the period before liability 
insurance was introduced in this country late in the 19th century.  I then review the evolution of 
these ideas in the major debates about tort reform and insurance that occurred over the next 
century and a half.  What this review reveals is not a slow and steady evolution of thought.  It is 
instead a story of basic insights about the relation between liability insurance and accident 
prevention that were recognized relatively early, but that went essentially unappreciated and 
undeveloped over a period of many decades, largely because there was such a heavy concern 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press 
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with the compensation of accident victims among those who thought and wrote about tort 
liability during this period. 
The story begins at a point when the idea of insuring against civil liability was 
highly suspect; liability insurance was considered almost immoral.  By the late 19th century 
there had been a decided shift in attitude, as the courts began to regard the purchase of liability 
insurance as a form of responsible behavior, ensuring that legal obligations could be performed.  
The courts at this point recognized that liability insurance was not necessarily inconsistent with 
accident prevention, because of its capacity to vary premiums with the risk posed by the 
insured’s activities.  But this potential received little attention in the early 20th century debates 
about the failure of the tort system adequately to compensate injured workers and auto accident 
victims. Rather, it was in these debates that ideas about liability insurance as a form of loss 
spreading, and possibly as a stop on the road to social insurance against accidental injury, began 
to emerge.  The mid-century enterprise liability theorists then developed these loss spreading 
ideas.  Only when subsequent scholars and policymakers ceased arguing about tort liability and 
its reform almost exclusively in social welfare terms, however, and began also to think of tort as 
the more complex and mixed system that it actually is, was it possible for insights about the 
relation between liability insurance and accident prevention to play a more significant role than 
they had until that time. 
 
 
I.  THE INTRODUCTION AND LEGITIMATION OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
For many decades we have tended to think of tort liability and liability insurance 
as going hand-in-hand.  By 1944 this view was so ingrained that it was possible for Roger 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art2 
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Traynor to argue that one of the principal justifications for the imposition of tort liability on 
business enterprises was that these enterprises could purchase insurance against liability and 
thereby broadly spread injury costs.
7  Traynor’s view helped to usher in an enterprise liability 
movement that was extremely influential during the ensuing decades.  Among other things it was 
heavily responsible for the modern law of products liability. 
The connection between tort liability and insurance, however, had not always 
been considered as natural or automatic as it seemed to be by the time Traynor crafted his 
concurrence in Escola.  Tort liability had existed in various forms long before the advent of 
liability insurance.  Before liability insurance even existed, when negligence law began to 
emerge in its modern form early in the 19th century, the validity of forms of coverage that 
seemed to insure against the consequences of negligence had to be addressed.   
A.  Intellectual Antecedents: The Barratry Defense and Liability Waivers 
What we now understand as liability insurance would not be introduced until the 
1880's.  Rather, the dominant forms of coverage during most of the 19th century were marine 
and fire insurance.  Both were first-party insurance that covered the policyholder against loss of 
its own property.  Whether and to what extent the insurance policies providing this coverage 
should be interpreted to cover losses resulting from the policyholder’s misfeasance, however, 
had been a matter of dispute for some time.  The doctrinal vehicle through which this issue was 
considered was the defense of barratry, which precluded insuring against losses caused by the 
neglect of the policyholder.   
Speaking of the defense in marine insurance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
                                                 
7See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). 
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Court noted that “It is the duty of the owner [of the vessel] to see that he intrusts the property of 
the insured with a man of competent skill, prudence, and discretion.  He is responsible for all 
losses or damage to the goods committed to his charge, which arise from his negligence, 
ignorance, or willful misconduct. . . The principle of an implied warranty on the part of the 
assured, that every thing shall be done to prevent a loss, pervades the whole subject of marine 
insurance. . .”
8  
The express question in cases such as this was how coverage language that was 
sufficiently general to be read as insuring against losses caused by negligence should be 
interpreted.   But the implicit question was whether encouraging, or at least tolerating, insurance 
against negligent conduct was desirable as a matter of public policy.  Phillips’ TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF INSURANCE put it this way: 
A person cannot protect himself by insurance against the 
loss occasioned by his own fraudulent acts and misconduct. . . an 
agreement by one party to indemnify another against losses 
voluntarily incurred, seems to be so obviously opposed to the 
general interest of the community, that it could hardly be enforced 
by a legal tribunal.  And there is the same objection, in a smaller 
degree, against sustaining a contract to indemnify a man against 
the consequences of his own negligence.  By such an agreement 
one man would consent to put himself wholly in the power of 
another, and it could operate only to the injury of the parties, and 
to the community of which they were members.
9  
 
As the middle of the 19th century approached, however, attitudes were evolving.  
Marine and fire insurers increasingly found that the defense of barratry was denied to them when 
                                                 
8Cleveland v. Union Insurance Company, 8 Mass. 308, 321-22 (1808); see also Grim v. Phoenix Insurance 
Company, 13 Johns 451 (N.Y. 1816) (fire damage caused by negligence not covered under marine insurance); 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860  202 (1977) (hereinafter “HORWITZ”). 
9See WILLARD PHILLIPS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 158 (1823); HORWITZ, supra note __, at 202 
(quoting Phillips). 
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they sought to avoid coverage obligations on the ground that the policyholder’s negligence had 
caused an otherwise-insured loss.
10  The change seems to have already begun to occur when 
Kent published the first edition of his Commentaries in 1826: “[I]t is a vexed question, rendered 
more perplexing by well-balanced decisions, and in direct opposition to each other, whether a 
loss by fire proceeding from negligence, be covered by a policy insuring against fire.”
11 
The decline of the barratry defense was not accompanied by any explicit 
recognition that there had been a shift in policy regarding the risk that such insurance might 
create “to the injury of the parties, and to the community of which they were members” that 
Phillips had described.  Rather, insurance policies whose literal terms covered losses caused by 
negligence were now understood simply to cover what they said they did.   
On the few occasions when the validity of devices that looked like liability 
insurance were called into question, however, concern with the consequences of permitting such 
insurance was still voiced.  For example, throughout the 19th century there was uncertainty 
about the extent to which common carriers would be permitted to contract out of their common 
law duties of care to passengers and the owners of goods that they transported.
12  This 
uncertainty reflected the tensions between freedom of contract, which grew in importance within 
the legal hierarchy of values as the century proceeded, and the desirability of ensuring protection 
for the customers of the common carrier.  As late as 1873, the U.S. Supreme Court agonized 
about the issue in the following way: 
The question is, whether such modification of 
                                                 
10See, e.g., Columbian Insurance Company v. Lawrence, 35 U.S. 507 (1836). 
11See 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 253-54 (1826). 
12See HORWITZ, supra note __, at 202.  
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responsibility by notice or special contract may not be carried 
beyond legitimate bounds, and introduce evils against which it was 
the direct policy of the law to guard; whether, for example, a 
modification which gives license and immunity to negligence and 
carelessness on the part of a public carrier or his servants, is not so 
evidently repugnant to that policy as to be altogether null and void; 
or, at least, null and void under certain circumstances.
13 
 
The Court’s reference to common carriers’ “modification” of their 
“responsibility” to the public reflected its concern with what today we would call “moral hazard” 
– the decreased tendency on the part of those who are insured to exercise care to avoid loss.  
Underscoring the point, the Court went on to quote a New York decision expressing concern 
about the effects of that state’s rule permitting abrogation of a common carrier’s duty of high 
care to its passengers: “`The fruits of this rule,’ says Judge Davis, `are already being gathered in 
increasing accidents, through the decreasing care and vigilance on the part of these corporations; 
and they will continue to be reaped until a just sense of public policy shall lead to legislative 
restriction upon the power to make this kind of contracts.’”
14 
This concern was evidenced not only in connection with the liability of common 
carriers to passengers and shippers, but also regarding amounted to liability insurance hidden in 
the interstices of first-party  policies themselves.  For example, first-party marine insurance 
against the loss of ships and cargo at sea sometimes covered liability for the “running down” of 
one ship by another. But this form of coverage was also subject to the barratry defense of the 
policyholder’s negligence, except under unusual circumstances.
15  An English court early in the 
                                                 
13New York Central R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 360 (1873). 
14Id. at 368, quoting Stinson v. New York Central Railroad Co., 32 N.Y. 337 (1865). 
15 See Mary Coate McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 26, 27 
(1941). 
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19th century had indicated that “it would be an illegal insurance to insure against what might be 
the consequences of the wrongful acts of the assured,” but created an exception where the 
policyholders were also commonly insurers and were therefore “as much interested to extend the 
principle of loss as to restrain it.”
16  As time went on, however, this kind of rhetoric became less 
common, and the overall willingness of the courts to countenance legal arrangements that in one 
way or another transferred liability risk from one party to another seemed to increase. 
Horwitz attributes the increased acceptance of insurance as the 19th century 
proceeded to the rise of an actuarial consciousness during this period,
17 and it may well be that at 
this time there was a transformation in the understanding of both insurance and the events that 
insurance covers.  On the older view, insurance was just one of many forms of indemnity, in 
which risk was merely transferred from one party to another.  With the transfer of risk came the 
undesirable removal of responsibility from the party who was transferring it.  On the other hand, 
once insurance began to be seen as a risk pooling mechanism in which the insurer is the vehicle 
by which the law of averages can be enlisted to protect both insurer and insured, the insurance 
transaction would have been much more easily viewed as a means of economic planning and 
stabilization than as a device for avoiding common law responsibilities. 
In my view, however, the courts had not yet come completely around to this 
actuarial way of understanding insurance as the 20th century approached.  Rather, although their 
conception of insurance was evolving, they continued to be ambivalent about the connection 
between insurance (and devices like it, such as indemnity agreements and liability waivers) and 
accident prevention.  And as we will see, when the courts came squarely to address the validity 
                                                 
16Delanoy v. Robson, 5 Taunt. 605 (1814).  
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of liability insurance, their thinking did not seem to be informed by an actuarial point of view.  
B.  The Rise of Liability Insurance  
The problematic relation between insurance and “responsibility” found expression 
in a number of important late-19th century decisions upholding the validity of liability insurance 
against the contention that permitting insurance for negligence would encourage negligent 
conduct.  In these decisions the way the responsibility theme was expressed and applied began to 
be transformed. 
It was no accident that the courts were not called upon to address the validity of 
liability insurance until nearly the dawn of the 20th century.  Liability insurance was first 
marketed in the United States in the 1880's, having been imported from Great Britain, where it 
was also a very recent invention.
18  The first form of liability insurance coverage was 
“Employers’ Liability Insurance,” designed to protect employers against liability to their 
employees in the era before the enactment of workers’ compensation.  In short order a “public 
liability” feature was added to such policies, a feature that became central after workers’ 
compensation was enacted.  These policies eventually evolved into today’s commercial liability 
insurance.
19 
The first cases challenging the validity of liability insurance each involved 
common carriers.  That common carriers would be involved makes sense for two reasons.  First, 
common carriers such as railroads and steamships were disproportionately likely to be involved 
                                                                                                                                                             
17See HORWITZ, supra note __, at 226-37. 
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in tort suits, and therefore likely to be among the first defendants who would seek to take 
advantage of their newly-purchased liability insurance policies.  Second, because common 
carriers had a high duty of care, it was in connection with the purchase of liability insurance by 
this particular kind of enterprise that the diminution of “responsibility” argument against the 
validity of liability insurance had the greatest chance of succeeding.  If enterprises whose 
conduct was as affected by the public interest as common carriers could validly purchase 
insurance that risked diminishing their incentive to comply with their common law duty, then 
other enterprises whose conduct was less affected by the public interest would surely be 
permitted to purchase liability insurance.  The opposition to liability insurance was thus likely to 
make its strongest argument in cases involving common carriers. 
The first notable attack came indirectly.  In Phoenix Ins. Co. Of Brooklyn v. Erie 
& Western Transportation Co.,
20 a marine insurer had paid the shipper of goods for a loss, and 
brought a subrogation action against the carrier of the goods.  The carrier’s defense was that 
because the contract of carriage gave the carrier the benefit of the shipper’s insurance, the 
insurer had no right of subrogation,
21  presumably under the rule that an insurer cannot have 
subrogation against its own insured.
22 
The insurer seems to have contended, among other things, that providing the 
carrier with the benefit of the shipper’s insurance was invalid, because it amounted to insuring 
the carrier against liability for its own negligence.  The case eventually made its way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which brushed this contention aside, citing as authority the earlier decisions 
                                                 
20117 U.S. 312 (1886) (hereinafter “Phoenix”). 
21Id. 
22See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 192 (3d ed. 2000). 
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abolishing the barratry defense of the policyholder’s negligence in cases in which the carrier had 
purchased its own fire or marine insurance.
23  But of course the tension between responsibility 
for negligently causing accidents and insuring against that liability did not automatically 
disappear, and the Court seemed to feel compelled to reconcile that tension.  It attempted to do 
so in a memorable phrase that would heavily influence courts subsequently addressing the issue: 
“By obtaining insurance,” the Court said, the insured “does not diminish his responsibility to the 
owners of the goods, but rather increases his means of meeting that responsibility.”
24 
Phoenix was the first decision after the introduction of liability insurance in this 
country to confirm that insurance whose effect was to cover the consequences of negligence was 
not invalid.   All Phoenix did literally, however, was hold that the barratry defense of the 
policyholder’s negligence was abolished under marine insurance policies, not only when the 
claim was made by the named insured, but also when a party given the benefit of that insurance 
by contract was sued by the insurer in its capacity as subrogee of the named insured.  Phoenix 
itself did not involve liability insurance, and the dispute in Phoenix concerned what amounted to 
indirect insurance against liability for damage to property, not against liability for personal 
injury. 
It was not long, however, before what we might call the “Phoenix doctrine” was 
applied expressly and directly to insurance against liability for personal injury.  In 1896 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland squarely rejected an attack on the validity of Employer’s Liability 
insurance, relying on the now well-established applicability of fire and marine insurance to 
losses resulting from the policyholder’s negligence, and citing the Phoenix doctrine as authority 
                                                 
23See Phoenix, supra note __, 117 U.S. at 324. 
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for its decision.
25  The court dismissed the contention that the policy was invalid because its 
“inevitable tendency or effect” would be “to induce less vigilance or to promote greater 
carelessness” on the part of the policyholder.
26 Liability insurance, the court said, does not in any 
way relax the carrier’s duty of care and vigilance to the public.  This is because insurance is “at 
best limited and partial” and because the policyholder will “endeavor to reduce the sum total of 
his insurance to a minimum figure, and thereby diminish the amount of the annual premium rate 
charged him for it,” which will “always depend in a large measure, if not entirely, upon the 
prudence, care, and skill with which his affairs are managed and conducted.  Such a carrier has, 
consequently, exactly the same motive or incentive to protect the public and the individual from 
injury that he would have if he should become his own insurer. . .”.
27  A year later the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey reached the same result, employing similar reasoning and also quoting 
Phoenix.
28   
Thus, the introduction and judicial acceptance of liability insurance did not signal 
the demise of the responsibility theme.  The Phoenix doctrine openly acknowledged the 
importance of responsibility.  Phoenix and its progeny simply rejected the contention that there 
was anything inconsistent about being discouraged from engaging in negligent conduct by the 
threat of liability for the consequences of that conduct, while simultaneously insuring against 
such liability.  
                                                                                                                                                             
24Id. 
25Boston & A.R. Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. Of Baltimore, 37 A. 778, 786-87 (Md.1896). 
26Id. at 786.  
27Id. at 787. 
28Trenton Pass. R. Co. v. Guarantors Liability Indemnity Co., 37 A.609, 611 (N.J. 1897) 
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In Phoenix itself this notion was virtually an ipse dixit without much reasoning to 
support it.  Merely saying that being insured against liability for negligence does not diminish 
the incentive to be careful does not make it so.  But the Maryland Court of Appeals’ effort to 
reconcile the tension between responsibility and insurance by invoking the notion that varying 
premiums with the amount of “prudence, care, and skill” exercised by the policyholder would 
maintain all necessary incentives constituted a more substantive argument and tended also to be 
quoted in subsequent decisions.  
The new doctrine validating liability insurance was accepted virtually without 
objection, both at the time and as time went on.  The only vigorous judicial criticism I have 
located came a decade later, when the Supreme Court of Missouri applied the doctrine in the 
face of an extensive dissent that expressly took issue with the Phoenix doctrine.
29  The dissent 
simply could not accept what it took to be the core of the doctrine, that liability insurance does 
not undermine accident prevention: 
With all due respect for the opinion of that great court, yet 
we challenge the soundness of the logic of certain portions of the 
argument advanced and the correctness of the conclusions reached 
therein regarding this question.  In our judgment, when a carrier 
knows that a third person is required to furnish the means from his 
own pocket with which to pay for the injuries done by his 
negligence to the passenger, then that consideration has a direct 
and potent influence in encouraging negligence on the part of the 
                                                 
29Breeden v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 119 S.W.576 (Mo. 1909). 
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carrier.
30 
The court then added: 
If [liability insurance] does not encourage negligence and 
stimulate carelessness in the discharge of the carrier’s duties to the 
passenger, then I must confess that I am ignorant of human nature, 
the general mode of transacting business, the motives and 
considerations which prompt the human family to action, and the 




But the Breeden dissent was the dying gasp of an older point of view.  That view 
saw the common carrier’s “responsibility” as lying in its duty to exercise care to avoid causing 
personal injury.  In contrast, the newer point of view saw responsibility differently.  When the 
Phoenix Court said that, by purchasing liability insurance, the policyholder does not diminish his 
responsibility “but rather increases his means of meeting that responsibility,”
32 it did not 
conceive of “responsibility” as the obligation to avoid negligence.  If insurance increases the 
policyholder’s “means of meeting” his “responsibility,” then the responsibility in question 
cannot be the obligation not to cause injury, or the obligation not to be negligent.  Whatever one 
thinks about whether being insured has a negative impact on safety, almost certainly the Court 
was not saying that insurance has a positive impact: insurance does not “increase” the 
                                                 
30Id. at 581. 
31Id. at 585.  True to its principles, the dissent listed a parade of horribles that would follow the majority’s 
decision: “If this so-called species of insurance is valid, then by the same course of reasoning a physician or surgeon 
may insurer against his acts of malpractice, or other negligent acts in the sick room, and act with perfect impunity. 
And, based upon the same authorities relied upon by counsel for respondent in this case, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, in a recent case, has just held that the owner of an automobile may insure against all damages he may 
be compelled to pay to any third person in consequence of his negligence in operating the same. . . Already we see 
mere children, almost daily, driving automobiles, with their attending dangers, along our streets at a high rate of 
speed, from 20 to 30 miles an hour.  Would any sensible man suppose for a moment that parents would tolerate that 
recklessness for a moment if they were not indemnified against all damages which might flow from such conduct? 
Certainly not.”  Id. at 584-85. 
32117 U.S. at 324. 
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policyholder’s “means” of preventing accidents. 
Insurance does, however, increase the policyholder’s means of paying for the 
costs of accidents.  If this is the increased means of meeting responsibility to which the Phoenix 
doctrine was referring, then the very idea of responsibility has begun to evolve, from 
“responsibility” to avoid negligently injuring others, toward “responsibility” to compensate for 
injury when it occurs.   Liability insurance is transformed in this evolution into a vehicle for 
ensuring compensation to the injured.  And once liability insurance also is understood as not 
being wholly incompatible with accident prevention, then the seeds of the modern functioning of 
liability insurance have been planted.   
Nevertheless, it is important to underscore not only what the new thinking about 
liability insurance was at this point, but also what it was not.  By the dawn of the 20th century 
the courts were rejecting the concern that liability insurance would so undermine safety 
incentives that this new form of insurance was against public policy.  And they had come to see 
the benefit of liability insurance as a means of ensuring that the policyholder would be able to 
compensate those it tortiously injured – as a means of “meeting that responsibility” rather than 
shirking it.  The courts rejecting attacks on liability insurance consistently emphasized the fact 
that those purchasing liability insurance were not relieving themselves of any obligation to those 
they injured.  The Maryland Court of Appeals noted, for example, that “Notwithstanding such 
insurance, the carrier remains liable to the owner or shipper of the goods, and by insuring them 
he merely contracts, as in every other instance of a reinsurance, with some one else for 
reimbursement of such loss.”
33 
                                                 
33Boston & A.R. Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. Of Baltimore, 37 A. 778, 786 (Md.1896); see also 
Trenton Pass. R. Co. v. Guarantors Liability Indemnity Co., 37 A. 609, 611 (N.J. 1897) (“The insured is held to the 
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But there is nothing in these opinions to suggest that the courts were thinking in 
anything other than two-party terms.  The common carrier had a responsibility to compensate 
those injured by its negligence, and liability insurance helped to assure that such compensation 
would be available.  There was no reference, however, to the way in which the purchase would 
be financed, to the fact that other similarly situated common carriers would also be purchasing 
insurance, or to the possibility that shipping costs would rise and that customers as a group might 
therefore be footing some of the bill for the carrier’s liability insurance.  In short, the courts were 
not yet speaking about the loss-spreading effects of liability insurance.  In their reasoning there 
were no other policyholders in the background, no risk-sharing benefits being taken into account. 
For these courts, liability insurance was for all intents and purposes just like an ordinary 
indemnity that transfers financial responsibility from one free-standing party to another. It would 
take another step in the evolution of thinking about liability insurance before loss spreading 
considerations of this sort would be brought into play. 
II.  THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DEBATE 
The courts were not the only forum in which the relation between injury 
prevention and insurance was being worked through during this period.  In the decade after the 
Phoenix doctrine found acceptance in the state courts, a national debate about the proper method 
of handling workplace injuries culminated in the enactment of workers’ compensation acts 
around the country.
34  The rhetoric and reasoning in this debate and in the discussions of 
workers’ compensation following its enactment reveal how an incipient conception of the role of 
                                                                                                                                                             
performance of his duty of vigilance both by his liability notwithstanding the indemnity, and by the fact that the 
vigilant carrier would obtain better terms in making the contracts of insurance.”). 
34At the time, of course, these acts were referred to as “workman’s” compensation, but I will employ the 
modern usage that refers to “workers” without regard to their gender.. 
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loss spreading first began to figure in the arguments about the new system. 
The labor movement entered the early years of the debate over workers’ 
compensation convinced that a tort remedy for employer negligence, reformed to eliminate or 
mitigate the “unholy trinity” of employer defenses (the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, 
and contributory negligence) would serve workers’ interests best.
35 Witt argues that concern over 
the potential loss of traditional employee control over the manner of labor in the workplace 
influenced this reluctance of labor to support workers’ compensation, which had been enacted in 
Great Britain in 1897 and in Germany before that.
36  Whatever the explanation, labor support for 
workers’ compensation fully materialized in 1909, when Samuel Gompers of the American 
Federation of Labor came out in favor of workers’ compensation.
37 
The predominant rationale deployed in favor of workers’ compensation was that 
with the employer’s control over the workplace came responsibility for any injury that occurred 
there.  There was little dispute, of course, that the employer was responsible for injuries caused 
by its negligence (perhaps subject to defenses); the crux of the debate about the wisdom, and 
indeed the constitutionality, of workers’ compensation was whether the law should impose 
responsibility on employers for injuries that were not caused by negligence. 
The argument made against imposing liability without fault was that, because 
there was nothing the employer should have done (and in some cases, could have done) to 
prevent an injury not caused by its negligence, imposing liability without fault amounted to a 
                                                 
35See PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT CANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS 
OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 94 (2000) ( hereinafter “PRELUDE”.) 
36See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 89 (2004); John Fabian Witt, The Transformation of 
Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842 -1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467 (1998). 
37See PRELUDE, supra note __, at 101. 
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taking of his property without due process of law.  Thus, the argument went, workers’ 
compensation does nothing to conserve the health, safety, or morals of employees and therefore 
exceeds the police power of the state.
38  An employer held liable without fault is merely forced 
to insure against liability, either directly, or by raising the price of its goods or services,
39 but is 
not required to do anything to make employees safer. 
The ultimately successful policy and legal response given by proponents of the 
legislation was that workers’ compensation would in fact contribute to the health and safety of 
employees and was therefore both a constitutional and sensible exercise of the police power.  
The core of the proponents’ argument was that neither tort liability on the part of employers nor 
insurance privately purchased by employees – nor a combination of the two – provided adequate 
compensation for workplace injuries.  Workers’ compensation, in contrast, had a better chance of 
doing so.  Ensuring that there was a means of compensating injured employees who would 
otherwise be left destitute was sufficient contribution to their health and safety to fall within the 
police power of the state.  Interestingly, there was much more emphasis on this prong of the 
justification for workers’ compensation than on the notion that moving to what would later be 
called enterprise-based strict liability on the part of the employer might actually promote 
accident reduction.  In short, workers’ compensation was justified by its proponents largely on 
compensation grounds.  It was in this sense a first step in developing a system of social 
welfare.
40 
                                                 
38See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 442-43 (N.Y. 1911).  For discussion Ives and its 
background, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 152- 86 (2004). 
39Id. at 439-40. 
40See PRELUDE, supra note __, at 1-6. 
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Two foundational documents in this debate illustrate the character of the 
arguments that flew back and forth.  Crystal Eastman’s classic study of industrial accident 
compensation in Pittsburgh was an indictment of the deficiencies of the tort system.
41  It 
demonstrated that there was a dramatic gap between the losses suffered by workers and the 
amounts they recovered in tort, when they recovered at all, and recommended the adoption of 
workers’ compensation as a substitute for tort.  Eastman found that, of the 258 cases involving 
the workplace death of a married man in Pittsburgh during a twelve-month period in 1906-07, 
164 plaintiffs recovered $500 or less, 59 of whom recovered nothing.  Of the 40 who recovered 
more, none received more than $2000.  Thus, only 30 percent recovered more than $500 for the 
death of a bread winner.
42   
The very fact that Eastman’s study focused on the deaths of married workers 
shows how much the overall concern was for compensation that would not leave families 
destitute, rather than accident prevention.  Otherwise the deaths of single men (and women) 
would surely have been given equal attention.  This emphasis was a reflection of what in the 
study as a whole was a worker-protection theme that was tinged with paternalism. The employer 
was seen to have a responsibility for compensating worker injuries both because injured workers 
and their families were in need and because the employer was in a position of control that 
rendered him responsible for what occurred in the workplace.
43 
Eastman’s study focused almost exclusively on the causes of industrial accidents 
                                                 
41CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (1910). 
42Id. at 120-21. 
43Witt describes this as concern with the “family wage.”  See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL 
REPUBLIC 132 (2004).  
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and the need of workers for compensation.  Although the study contained discussions of accident 
prevention, for the most part they identified the generic categories of employer negligence whose 
elimination would reduce accident rates: “lack of provision for safety in the original construction 
of the working place. . . defects in plant or equipment [that] could have been prevented by a 
more frequent and careful inspection,” etc. The only arguable examples of safety improvement 
that did not involve eliminating employer negligence were the employment of children and long 
hours of work.
44  At only a few points in the book was there any intimation that imposing 
liability on the employer for all accidents, whether or not they resulted from negligence, would 
enhance accident prevention.
45 
Nor was there much reference at all to the potential availability or impact of 
insurance against the new form of workers’ compensation liability that Eastman recommended.  
The assumption throughout was simply that the employer should bear the costs of accidents. The 
concern was whether, and if so by how much, these costs would increase if tort were displaced 
by workers’ compensation.  There was substantially less consideration of whether the shift of 
liability to employers would reduce accidents and therefore reduce accident costs.  The dominant 
theme was that the employer would fulfill its responsibility not necessarily by preventing 
accidents, but rather by ensuring compensation to the employee for injuries suffered in the 
accidents that do occur. 
                                                 
44Id. at 105-07. 
45“And yet, in the fact of the unremitting pressure for output, the motive for prevention can never be 
compelling until to each injury and death is affixed a uniform and inescapable penalty.  If accidents became a heavy 
and determinable cost to the business not dependent upon the cleverness of lawyers, the leanings of judges, or the 
sympathies of juries, but directly proportioned to the number of deaths and the number and seriousness of injuries 
among the men on the payroll, then the prevention of them would become of direct economic interest to the 
employer.”  Id. at 114. 
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There was also virtually no consideration given in Eastman’s work to the ultimate 
distribution of costs that would result from the adoption of workers’ compensation.  She seemed 
to recognize that in the long run the costs of workers’ compensation would not necessarily be 
paid by the employer.  In enumerating the requirements that she believed a workers’ 
compensation law must satisfy, for example, Eastman said that “it must shift a considerable 
share of the burden of each accident from the family immediately affected to the business, and 
thus to the whole body of consumers.”
46  But this assumption that accident costs would be spread 
to consumers was never analyzed, and the benefits of the broad spreading of costs that would 
result were not identified as one of the arguments in favor of moving to the new system she 
proposed. 
Eastman’s work helped to set the stage for the enactment of workers’ 
compensation.  But the seminal document in the field was the Wainwright Commission Report, 
which made the findings that supported the earliest noteworthy workers’ compensation statute, 
enacted in the State of New York in 1910.
47  The Commission, on which Eastman served, held 
11 day of hearings around the State in late 1909 and early 1910.  It heard testimony from 106 
witnesses and produced a 470 page transcript of this testimony.
48 
The central concern of this testimony was again the inadequacies of the tort 
system and the possible attractiveness of workers’ compensation as an alternative.  Just as in 
Eastman’s book, the witnesses focused more on the need for effective compensation of accident 
                                                 
46Id. at 220. 
47See State of New York, Laws of 1910, Ch. 674. 
48MINUTES OF EVIDENCE ACCOMPANYING THE FIRST REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAW OF 1909 TO INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION 
OF EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS iii-iv (1910) (hereinafter “MINUTES”). 
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victims than on the potential injury-reduction effect of a move to worker’s compensation.  The 
worker-protection theme again was dominant. What little reference to insurance against workers’ 
compensation liability one finds in the testimony reflects differences of opinion about whether 
premium rates would rise or fall under such an approach.
49  The uncertainty about this issue 
resulted from the fact that, although the number of injuries for which compensation was payable 
would increase under workers’ compensation, the average amount that would actually be paid 
per injury might either increase or decrease.
50 
In addition, how successful liability insurance could actually be in encouraging 
loss prevention was unclear at this time, despite the analysis that had persuaded the Maryland 
Court of Appeals a decade earlier.  Even before the enactment of workers’ compensation, the 
companies writing Employers Liability insurance had understood that varying premiums in 
accordance with factors that policyholders could control might affect safety levels. As early as 
the turn of the century, for example, the Travelers insurance company was inspecting the 
premises of its policyholders and giving them reductions in premiums for complying with safety 
standards.
51  But Travelers’ own company history  recounts the difficulties it encountered in 
getting policyholders to make safety changes. This history quoted one of the early inspectors as 
saying “`We enjoyed little cooperation and much downright antagonism.  The boss had no 
interest in the elimination of the danger, and the workers themselves had become so used to 
                                                 
49Id. at 39, 47, 75. 
50Although workers’ compensation benefits would be paid on a much less generous basis than was in 
principle available in tort, “full” tort damages were often not recovered in tort.  As a consequence, it was uncertain 
whether actual payouts in workers’ compensation would be larger or smaller than in tort. 
51See TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS: 100 YEARS 55-56 (1964). 
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conditions that they resisted change.’”
52  
The focus of the Wainwright Commission Report itself largely reflected the 
character of the testimony before the Commission, and the data on accidents and compensation 
that the Commission independently gathered.
53  There was much emphasis in the Report on the 
inadequacies of the compensation received by workers under the tort system, on the absence of 
significant sources of insurance to which employees had access on their own, on the waste and 
delay entailed in the system, and on the antagonism between employees and employees that the 
system produced.
54  The new system the Commission proposed in the Report would remove 
these deficiencies by making the cost of industrial accidents a cost of doing business that would 
be passed on to the consuming public.
55  Although there was passing reference to the potential of 
the new system to reduce the incidence of accidents,
56 the Report noted at the outset that the 
Commission had not yet been able to address the causes and prevention of accidents, promising 
to address these issues in a subsequent Report.
57 
A few passages in the Report, however, also reflected its authors’ awareness that 
the costs of accidents were likely to be spread broadly if the new system were enacted.  At the 
outset, the Report indicated that “. . . just as employers now fix their selling price with reference 
                                                 
52Id. at 55. 
53See REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER 
CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF 1909 TO INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY AND OTHERS 
MATTERS (First Report 1910) (hereinafter “WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT”). 
54Id. at 19-36.  
55Id. at 7.   
56Id. at 5-7. 
57Id. at 2. 
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to the costs of replacing and repairing machinery, so we would have them make an element of 
the price of the product the cost of relieving injured workers of hazardous industry.”
58  Despite 
its recognition of this potential loss-spreading effect, the Report made no further reference to 
loss spreading until a short passage near the end on the cost of the proposed system, in which the 
Report argued that 
If the bridge builder in the State of New York must pay more to his 
employees in the shape of damages or compensation for injuries, 
that additional cost will be reflected in the total cost of building the 
bridges, adjust as would a rise in wages or a rise in the cost of 
materials; but when the law is know the bridge-builder and the 
house builder will make his contracts accordingly and his prices 
accordingly, and no man will be deprived or property or unduly 
mulcted.  The community at large will then support the injured 
workman by compensation through the employer in the first 
instance, rather than through increased taxes for charity.
59 
 
But when it came time to provide the summary of the Report’s conclusions that 
was later so famously quoted in Ives,
60 the points that were highlighted involved the flaws in the 
existing system, not the benefits of the proposed new one: 
The summary of our investigation on employers’ liability then is: 
 
First, that the present system in New York rests on a basis 
that is economically unwise and unfair, and that in operation it is 
wasteful, uncertain, and productive of antagonism between 
workmen and employers. 
 
Second, that it is satisfactory to none and tolerable only to 
those employers and workmen who practically disregard their legal 
rights and obligations and fairly share the burden of accidents in 
industries. 
 
                                                 
58Id. at 7.  
59Id. at 67. 
60See Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., supra note __, 94 N.E. at 436. 
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Third, that the evils of the system are most marked in 
hazardous employments, where the trade risk is high and serious 
accidents frequent. 
 
Fourth, that, as matter of fact, workmen in the dangerous 
trades do not, and practically cannot, provide for themselves 
adequate accident insurance, and therefore, the burden of serious 
accidents falls on the workmen least able to bear it, and brings 
many of them and their families to want.
61 
 
Yet in its conclusion the Report once again made a brief argument based in part 
on loss spreading: “These results can, we think, be best avoided by compelling the employer to 
share the accident burden in intrinsically dangerous trades, since by fixing the price of his 
product the shock of the accident may be borne by the community.” 
In these brief passages we see the very beginnings of a new rationale for the 
imposition of liability, and indirectly a new rationale for liability insurance: not simply providing 
a means by which compensation may be assured, but also a means by which the burden of 
providing compensation may be distributed broadly.  Commentators writing at the time similarly 
made note of, though they did not strongly emphasize, this loss spreading rationale.  For 
example, Francis Bohlen, one of the leading tort scholars of the period, pointed out what he 
seemed to suggest was a distinctly minority view: “there is a further body of public opinion, that 
of the advanced collectivist who believes that society as a whole should share the shock of 
industrial accidents rather than that it should be borne by the particular individuals whose ill 
fortune it is to suffer it immediately, and so desires to place the burden primarily upon the 
employer, who, in theory at least, can add the cost to the price of his product and so distribute the 
                                                 
61See WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note __, at 68. 
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loss among that part of the community at least whose wants call his business into existence.” 
62 
At this point then, the loss-spreading rationale for workers’ compensation played 
a secondary role, not only in the reasoning of the Report of the Wainwright Commission, but 
also in the course of arguments about constitutionality of workers’ compensation. After the 
statute enacted it was challenged and declared unconstitutional in the famous Ives case.
63  The 
New York Constitution was amended to authorize workers’ compensation, a new (and modified) 
statute was enacted, and the constitutionality of that statute ultimately was challenged in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  In rejecting that challenge, the Court held that providing a quid pro quo in 
return for expanding the employer’s liability was sufficient to avoid due process and takings 
concerns.  The Court thus reasoned that it was not unreasonable for the employer to be required 
to pay workers’ compensation benefits in return for being relieved of tort liability for employee 
injuries.
64  There was no reference in the opinion to the incentive effects that might be created by 
the new form of liability or by insurance against that liability.  Nor was there any consideration 
given to the loss spreading effects that liability might generate, as the Wainwright Commission 
had predicted, if only briefly. That is, the Court felt no need to buttress its position by refuting 
the argument that imposing liability without fault could not enhance safety, and did nothing 
more than shift costs from the employees to the employer.  
In summary, although the rudiments of the relationship among liability, insurance, 
and accident prevention were understood by the time that workers’ compensation was enacted, 
                                                 
62See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. 
REV. 328, 330 (1911). 
63See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). 
64New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 203-44 (1917). 
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the central documents in the workers’ compensation debate that I have examined place this 
relationship mainly in the background. The assumption throughout was that costs would be 
passed through from the employer to the consuming public, and although this was regarded as an 
advantage, its significance was not fully appreciated.  Even when there was recognition that 
varying insurance premiums with the liability experience of an employer might influence its 
incentive to take additional safety precautions, there was uncertainty about how likely this was to 
occur.
65  The important thing was that the employer would be held financially responsible for 
employee injuries and that as a consequence employees would receive some compensation. 
There was also a recognition that these costs would in some measure ultimately be distributed 
more broadly.  Exactly how, and exactly what impact the system would have on accident 
prevention, however, were uncertain and of less significance than the fact that compensation 
would take place. 
III.  THE AUTO ACCIDENT PROBLEM AND THE COLUMBIA PLAN 
The next major event in the history of tort reform was the publication of the 
COLUMBIA PLAN in 1932.
66  Proposed by a group of eminent scholars, judges, and lawyers, the 
Plan envisioned the mandatory purchase of automobile liability insurance by all owners of motor 
vehicles, together with the adoption of strict liability for auto-related personal injuries, the 
provision of partial compensation for economic loss but not general damages, and the 
                                                 
65For example, in its promised second Report on the causes and prevention of accidents, submitted after 
enactment of the workers’ compensation statute, the Commission expressed concern that in a highly competitive 
insurance market premiums would not vary sufficiently to create safety incentives. REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF 1909 TO INQUIRE 
INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY AND OTHERS MATTERS 9 (Second Report 1911). 
66REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTO ACCIDENTS TO THE COLUMBIA 
UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1932) (hereinafter the “COLUMBIA PLAN”). 
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administrative resolution of disputes.
67  The Plan was clearly and expressly based on the 
workers’ compensation model; not only did it propose imposing strict liability for auto accidents 
on those causing the accidents, it also recommended a reduction of compensation to correspond 
with the expansion of liability and the adoption of a benefit schedule modeled on the workers’ 
compensation schedule.
68  Like the Wainwright Commission Report, it marshaled an extensive 
array of statistics in support of the proposition that there was a substantial accident problem 
resulting in inadequate compensation of victims.
69  But the Plan paid little attention to the 
possible impact of its adoption on accident prevention, in fact concluding that “compulsory 
insurance has no demonstrable effect on accident frequency” and that “If . . . the fear of personal 
injury will not restrain careless driving, it is not to be supposed that the fear of having to pay 
money will do so.”
70 
The Plan was never enacted anywhere, in part because the advent of the 
Depression brought other economic problems to the forefront of public policy, and in part 
because there was no consensus that auto accidents were sufficiently similar to workplace 
injuries to warrant treating them in the same way.  The debates that followed the debut of the 
Plan reveal that the relationships between drivers and passengers, between drivers and 
pedestrians, and especially between drivers and other drivers often were not seen as sufficiently 
analogous to the relationship between employers and employees to garner a consensus in favor 
                                                 
67Id. at 132-44. See also Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and 
the Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 4 CONN. INS. L. J. 521, 571-84 (discussing the COLUMBIA 
PLAN). 
68See the COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note __,  at 140. 
69Id. at 53-96. 
70Id. at 160-61. 
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of adopting a strict liability approach modeled on workers’ compensation.  Whereas employers 
were automatically in a position to pass on the costs of accidents to the consuming public, most 
drivers were individuals who were not driving for business purposes and could not raise prices in 
order to cover the increased costs of liability.  The question of which driver was a “cause” of 
injury in two-vehicle accidents could not be satisfactorily resolved with the same kind of bright-
line rule that enabled workers’ compensation to hold the employer liable as the “cause” of  all 
injuries except those resulting from the employee’s wilful misconduct.  And perhaps most 
importantly, the worker-protection rationale that had been so compelling in the employment 
context fell flat here.  Whereas workers’ compensation had a somewhat paternalistic quality that 
critics of the Plan seemed to accept, they could see no basis for a similar paternalism in the auto 
accident context.  
The most significant innovation proposed by the COLUMBIA PLAN was its use of 
mandatory liability insurance as the mechanism for assuring victim compensation.  At this point 
only a handful of states required drivers to be insured. What the Phoenix Court had seen as a 
virtue, the Plan made a necessity.  Unlike employers, most drivers were not capable of paying 
compensation on their own; insurance was a necessary feature of the Plan if it were to fill the 
compensation gap.  The insurance requirement was thus simultaneously a method of assuring 
victim compensation and of imposing the kind of responsibility for injury that Phoenix had 
conceived of more than a generation earlier.  By mandating the purchase of liability insurance, 
the Plan did not diminish individual responsibility, but (in the language of the Phoenix doctrine) 
increased each driver’s “means of meeting that responsibility.” 
But there was a notable conflict between the reasoning behind the Plan and the 
reasoning of its critics.  Although the Plan itself was devoid of any reference to the loss 
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spreading that would result from the compulsory liability insurance it proposed, supporters of the 
Plan made it clear that this was one of its advantages.  The mandatory insurance requirement was 
a method of rendering individual drivers analogous to employers.  By purchasing insurance, each 
driver passed along the cost of the injuries he or she caused to a pool composed of all other 
drivers.  The cost of injuries was thereby collectivized.  Young B. Smith, Dean of the Columbia 
Law School, argued that 
The fact that employers and employees constitute separate and 
distinct classes, whereas frequently the victims of motor car 
accidents are also motorists, does not differentiate the cases for 
purposes of risk distribution. Workmen’s compensation laws 
would be no less effective in spreading losses resulting from 
injuries to workers even though there were large numbers of men 
who, simultaneously, occupied the position of employer in one 
enterprise and the position of employee in another. Likewise, the 
fact that a motorist, who is required to insure against injuries 
caused others by his car, may himself be injured by another’s car, 
does not affect the distribution of risks resulting from the operation 
of automobiles so long as all motorists are required to insure.
71 
 
Praising the Plan, Smith wondered whether it, “as did the report of the Wainwright Commission, 
foreshadows an impending development in the law looking towards a more scientific distribution 
of inevitable risks which are incident to an important and necessary activity in society.”
72 
The Director of Study for the Plan made a similar point: 
The problem is how to distribute the losses caused by automobile 
accidents in a way best suited to the public welfare.  Conceivably, 
the losses may be allowed to rest where they first fall, that is on the 
                                                 
71See Young B. Smith, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium – The Problem and Its 
Solution, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 792 (1932). 
72Id. at 786.  For this reason, Smith  thought that the Plan should have gone even further: “If the purpose of 
changing the present bases of risk distribution in the case of motor car accidents is to spread the losses thereby 
incurred over a larger group in the community, by placing upon motorists a more equitable share of the burden than 
is the case under existing law, one hesitates in approving a scale of compensation which falls so far short of 
accomplishing this result.” Id. at 801. 
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victim of the accident and often on his family. . . or they may be 
partly shifted to the shoulders of the motorist or of his insurance 
carrier under a scheme of liability for negligence; or they may be 
shifted, under a compensation scheme, to the motorists as a class 
or to all the taxpayers. . . If a compensation plan can be 
administered so as to spread losses as I have suggested, I believe 
that we should adopt it.
73 
 
To critics of the Plan, however, drivers simply were not in a position that was 
analogous to the position of employers, and liability insurance could not make them so.  
However serious the auto injury problem might be, the almost paternalistic, worker-protection 
aspect of workers’ compensation could not be transposed to the auto context.   For example, the 
General Counsel of the Maryland Casualty Company argued that employers and employees 
constituted “equally separate and distinct” classes so that 
. . . one distinct class is responsible (theoretically) for the 
conditions which produce accidents, and the other distinct and 
separate class is the victim of the accident. Employers do not claim 
compensation against workmen.. . . Nor is consideration is given to 
the fact that employers who do the paying under workmen’s 
compensation, in theory at least, have the money with which to 
pay, –money produced by the operations which caused the 
accident and the resulting loss to the victim; and thus the cost of 
payment can be readily absorbed by industry and distributed 
amongst all those who have to do with industry and its produces or 
service, including the recipients of the payments.
74 
 
Disputing the workers’ compensation analogy, another critic pointed out that 
under “the workmen’s compensation laws the employer is liable `regardless of fault’ only to his 
own employees and while they are acting with the scope of their employments, subject to his 
orders, whereas, under this plan a motorist would be liable to strangers whatever they might be 
                                                 
73Shippen Lewis, The Merits of the Automobile Compensation Plan, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 583, 
588-89 (1936). 
74August G. Lilly, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium -- Criticism of the Proposed 
Solution, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 803, 805 (1932). 
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doing.”
75  The Plan would therefore “amount to a wholesale shifting of the major responsibility 
for the economic consequences of wrongdoing on the highways from the wrongdoers to the 
unoffending.  The insurance would merely disguise and mitigate the consequences of this 
underlying vice.”
76 
What was being contested here was not just the practical difficulty entailed in 
determining ex ante who would be an injurer and who a victim, which the Plan handled in a 
somewhat wooden though nonetheless workable fashion.
77  More importantly, there was 
opposition in principle to the very idea of using insurance to conflate and render irrelevant the 
categories of injurer and victim.  For supporters of the Plan, auto liability insurance was a way of 
financing the proposed strict liability obligation to pay compensation that could otherwise not 
have been financed.  It was a way of assuring that there would be compensation for auto injuries. 
Compulsory insurance rendered feasible a form of liability that might not otherwise have been 
sensible to adopt.  But for the critics, liability insurance could be an appropriate method of 
financing liability only if the form of liability that it financed was otherwise justified.  Adding a 
compulsory liability insurance component to the Plan could not justify imposing strict liability; 
this form of liability had to be independently justified, and in the critics’ view this justification 
could not be given.  The dispute was thus over the extent to which an auto liability regime 
should function as a method of ensuring compensation for the injuries that would inevitably 
result from use of the automobile.  It is no surprise, therefore, that the role that liability insurance 
                                                 
75See P. Tecumseh Sherman, Grounds for Opposing the Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 3 LAW & 
CONTEM. PROB. 599, 600 (1936). 
76Id. at 601. 
77The COLUMBIA PLAN’S solution was to hold each driver liable for the other’s injuries, and to hold the 
other drivers in multi-vehicle accidents jointly and severally liable.  See the COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note __, at 139. 
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might actually play in influencing the level of those injuries had to take a back seat, so to speak, 
as a result of the more salient dispute over the compensation goals of the Plan.  
IV.  THE ERA OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY THEORY 
The period between the publication of the COLUMBIA PLAN and the mid-1960's 
was dominated by thinking about enterprise-based strict liability.  Two different sources of 
thinking about liability insurance during this period are worth examining.  In the first group are 
the enterprise liability theorists themselves – tort law scholars and judges who thought and wrote 
about this issue.  In the second group are insurance law scholars and insurance specialists who, 
while they tended not to write about enterprise liability, can provide a glimpse into 
contemporaneous thinking on the insurance side of the tort law-insurance divide. 
A.  The Tort Law Perspective 
Both workers’ compensation and the COLUMBIA PLAN influenced the next 
generation of reform advocates, the most prominent among them being the enterprise liability 
theorists Fleming James and Roger Traynor.
78 
James conducted a scholarly campaign in the 1940's and 1950's that attacked the 
fault standard and recommended a variety of changes that would promote broader distribution of 
the costs of accidental injury.
79  He regarded tort liability “as a means for distributing losses over 
society as a whole or some fairly large segment of it.”
80  He argued that “some good accrues 
from the fact of distribution itself,”  because “consistent distribution of losses over a large group 
                                                 
78For discussion of the enterprise liability movement, see VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, 
UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995). 
79See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 470-83 (1985).  
80See Fleming James, Jr., Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV. 
1156 (1941). 
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tends to substitute (through the operation of the law of large numbers) a certain and calculable 
cost for the uncertain risk of ruinous losses to individuals.” 
81 For James, the ultimate goal was 
the adoption of social insurance: “The full blessings of distribution can best be attained by 
comprehensive social insurance, but some measure of advantage may be had within the present 
framework of our law of torts, for many of its rules tend in practice to shift losses to agencies 
which can and do distribute them.”
82   
James thus picked up the compensatory impulse that lay at the heart of the 
COLUMBIA PLAN and gave it a rationale that had been at most inchoate in the Plan itself: net 
social gain would result from loss spreading.  In one of his only two articles on insurance itself, 
James argued at the outset that the best way to assure accident victims compensation is “to 
distribute the losses involved over society as a whole or some very large segment of it.  Such a 
basis for administering losses may be called social insurance.”
83  James used this term in 
different ways.  Sometimes he seems to have meant insurance that was financed out of general 
revenues, and sometimes he considered activity-based liability insurance that happened to spread 
costs broadly to be “social insurance.
84   Consequently, it is difficult to know how clearly James 
recognized the difference between the cost-internalization/accident prevention potential of 
enterprise-based strict liability, perhaps linked with liability insurance, and broadly loss-
distributive social insurance that was likely to be without much cost-internalization potential.  
                                                 
81Id. 
82Id. at 1156. 
83See Fleming James, Jr. Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 
549, 550 (1948).  The other article, Fleming James, Jr. & John V. Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of 
Torts, 15 LAW & CONTEM. PROBLEMS 431 (1950), is mainly concerned with the way in which expansion in various 
forms of insurance coverage had promoted expansion in the scope of tort liability. 
84Id. at 481. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press 
  36 
Since he was extremely skeptical of the accident prevention potential of tort liability anyway, the 
advantages of broad risk distribution took priority.
85  In his article on the impact of liability 
insurance on accident law he devoted only two paragraphs to the adjustment of premium rates to 
create safety incentives, in one of which paragraphs he noted the limitations of this device.
86  His 
focus was the expansion of liability in order to promote loss spreading, whether or not this 
resulted in additional accident prevention. 
Traynor, in contrast, focused much more clearly on activity-related liability 
insurance in developing the argument for enterprise-based  strict liability, and was more 
sanguine than James about the prospect that enterprise liability would promote accident 
prevention.
87  His concurrence in Escola,
88 which eventually served as the intellectual 
foundation for the adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, argued for product 
manufacturers’ strict liability on the grounds that manufacturers were both in the best position to 
minimize the risk of injury to product consumers and to insure against that risk.  But these two 
strands of argument were at this point evidently incompletely distinct – the passages in which 
Traynor discusses them move back and forth between the injury-reduction and insurance 
arguments without seeming to recognize that they are logically independent.
89  Product 
manufacturers might be superior injury-reducers, superior insurers, or both, but because Traynor 
                                                 
85Id. at 569 (“As for the branch of the law which is concerned with civil damages or their equivalent, it is 
doubtful whether it contributes very much to accident prevention.”) 
86Id. at 560-61.   
87Traynor’s role as a tort theorist more generally is discussed in G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 
180-210 (Expanded ed. 2003). 
88See supra note ___.  
89See id at __.  
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seems to have thought that in fact they were both, he did not need to distinguish carefully 
between these two capacities.  Two decades later, writing for a majority that was adopting 
enterprise liability rather in a concurrence, he gave the insuring function no express reference at 
all and was content to cite himself and James, along with Prosser, as sources for the arguments in 
favor of strict products liability.
90 
James, Traynor, and a number other scholars with similar views who wrote during 
the same decades
91 moved more explicitly than ever before beyond the Phoenix conception of 
liability insurance as a means meeting the responsibility to provide compensation, and toward 
the fully modern view of liability insurance as a means of spreading loss.  Their arguments for 
enterprise liability were based on a combination of the desirability of ensuring compensation, the 
benefits of greater loss spreading, and (for some of the theorists) the possibility of more effective 
accident reduction.  But it took time for the full complement of goals to be teased out of their 
arguments, in part because they were one-directional.  Neither James nor Traynor, for example, 
spent much effort identifying the situations in which enterprise liability would not make sense. 
A last though less well-known piece of scholarship that emerged at the end of this 
period illustrates this tendency.  Robert Morris’ Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process – 
The Insignificance of Foresight,
92 was published in the very issue of the YALE LAW JOURNAL in 
                                                 
90See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 701 (Cal. 1962). 
91See, e.g., Lester W. Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort 
Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1930); Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. 
REV. 359 (1951); Leon Green, The Individual’s Protection Under Negligence Law: Risk Sharing, 47 NW. U. L. REV. 
751 (1953).  
92See C. Robert Morris, Jr.,  Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process – The Insignificance of 
Foresight, 70 YALE L. J. 554 (1961). 
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which Guido Calabresi’s first piece of torts scholarship appeared in 1961.
93  Morris argued that, 
contrary to what some earlier scholars had argued, there was no need to limit enterprise liability 
to events that are in some sense foreseeable to the responsible enterprise, because the actuarial 
process that leads to insurance against tort liability makes that unnecessary.  Because of the way 
in which policyholders posing similar risks are grouped together for purposes of premium rating, 
and because the occurrence of low-probability events figures in only a minor way in the fixing of 
these rates, enterprises will not have much incentive to react to the prospect of liability for such 
events, whether they are “foreseeable” or not.  Further, unless a certain form of accident 
becomes part of a pattern that repeats itself with actuarial significance, liability insurance rates 
are unlikely to take this type of accident into account in any important way and are therefore 
unlikely to influence policyholder behavior.
94  The article by Morris thus seemed to confirm 
what earlier and more prominent scholars such as James especially had been saying: that liability 
insurance should be regarded primarily as a method of loss spreading, and not as a device that 
figures in any significant way in loss prevention.   
B.  The Perspective of Insurance Professionals and Insurance Law Scholars  
The story among insurance specialists and insurance law scholars during the 
enterprise liability period differs somewhat from the way that tort theorists were addressing the 
relation between liability insurance and accident prevention.  But the ultimate message that we 
can derive from their thinking is not far from what we saw prevailed among torts scholars and 
reformers.  Insurance lawyers and insurance law scholars made virtually no reference to the 
                                                 
93See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
94See C. Robert Morris, Jr.,  Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process – The Insignificance of 
Foresight, 70 YALE L. J. 554, 595 (1961). 
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relation between liability insurance and accident prevention in their work, over a period of many 
decades.  Whatever they may have known or assumed about the impact of liability insurance 
rating on accident prevention, this function did not figure in what they chose to address in their 
scholarly work.  In contrast, insurance professionals and business scholars understood that 
insurance premium rating had the potential to influence accident prevention, but they tended to 
discount the importance of this function. 
From the beginning and virtually across the board, insurance law scholars were 
apparently unconcerned with the impact of liability insurance on accident prevention.  For 
example, William Reynolds Vance was an important insurance law scholar of the early 20th 
century.  He taught at George Washington and then at the Yale Law School. He published a 
West “Hornbook” on insurance law just after the turn of the century,
95 and wrote more focused 
law review articles as well.
96  The first edition of Vance’s hornbook contained 609 pages of text, 
of which only the last 5 pages were devoted to liability insurance.
97  Unsurprisingly, there was 
no mention of accident prevention.  But even an expanded second edition, published more than 
25 years later at the beginning of the enterprise liability era, still treated liability insurance only 
in passing and contained no mention of accident prevention.
98 
Nor did the passage of time affect matters.  A 1957 treatise on insurance law by 
Edwin Patterson, Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia Law School and former 
                                                 
95See WILLIAM REYNOLDS VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE (1904). 
96See, e.g., William Reynolds Vance, The History of the Development of the Warranty in Insurance Law, 20 
YALE L.J. 523 (1911). 
97See WILLIAM REYNOLDS VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 604-09 (1904). 
98See WILLIAM REYNOLDS VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 912-18 (2d ed. 1930). 
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Deputy Superintendent of Insurance for the State of New York, contained no reference at all to 
the relation between liability insurance premium rates and accident prevention.
99  Fourteen years 
later, the first edition of Keeton’s widely-used insurance law hornbook contained a bare two 
paragraphs that made only glancing reference to the subject.
100  
I do not mean to suggest that none of these scholars was aware that liability 
insurance premiums could be and often were varied with the levels of risk posed by 
policyholders, or that changes in risk levels within the control of policyholders might affect 
premiums.  On the contrary, undoubtedly they were well aware of these practices.  Indeed, by the 
time Keeton wrote his insurance law treatise he had already co-authored an important book on 
no-fault auto insurance that analyzed this very potential in the context of the auto accident 
problem.
101  Rather, for the most part these scholars appear to have regarded the issue as being 
the beyond the purview of insurance law as a distinct subject.  They were writing about 
insurance law doctrines and (later in the period) the policy implications of these doctrines, not 
about the functions of insurance within the tort system or within the broader system of social 
welfare in which tort liability and workers’ compensation might be regarded as playing a part.  
The result was that they had no reason to explore or analyze the impact on or potential influence 
of liability insurance on accident prevention. 
On the other hand, turning to the insurance professionals and scholars, the picture 
is a bit different.  They were aware of the capacity of liability insurance to affect accident 
                                                 
99See EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1957). 
100See ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT 566-67 (1971). 
101See ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFERY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 371-73 
(1965). 
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prevention, but skeptical about it.  Writing fifteen years after workers’ compensation was 
adopted in New York, the authors of the leading treatise on the subject seemed to appreciate the 
accident prevention potential of the interaction between workers’ compensation and insurance.  
They first noted that “Industry should bear the cost [of work-related injury] so that it may be 
stimulated and encouraged to reduce it by removing the causes of injury. . . the industry having 
the lowest injury ratio will have a lowered cost of production and will, therefore, be at a decided 
advantage over its competitors.”
102  While this seemed to be a reference to differences across 
industries rather than among companies within a particular industry, there followed a later 
chapter on “Merit Rating” that extolled the virtues of varying premiums with the degree of risk 
posed by the policyholder: “By placing a penalty upon the risk which is worse than the average 
in its class, and by rewarding policyholders for their efforts in prevention in direct ratio to the 
results produced by the improvement in the condition of individual risks, merit rating 
commercializes safety.”
103 
Also in the period between the wars, Albert Mowbray, an actuary and Professor 
of Insurance at the University of California, published a general text on insurance as part of the 
McGraw-Hill Insurance series that included works by such well-known legal figures as 
Appleman and Patterson.  Mowbray’s book contained a short chapter devoted entirely to the 
topic “prevention of loss.”
104  Most of the chapter, however, addressed generic safety measures 
such as the founding of Underwriters Laboratories, the development of fire prevention devices, 
                                                 
102G.F. MICHELBACHER & THOMAS N. NIAL, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION INSURANCE 82 (1925). 
103Id. at 301. 
104ALBERT H. MOWBRAY, INSURANCE: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 32-44 (2d ed. 
1937). 
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and the value of safety inspections.
105  Only when he came to discuss workers’ compensation did 
Mowbray include a few sentences about the provision of rate reductions for reducing the risk of 
loss.
106  
Among insurance specialists, awareness of this potential for liability insurance 
rating to promote accident prevention  persisted in the coming decades, but it continued to take a 
back seat to other concerns.  Thus, writing for a largely legal audience shortly after World War 
Two, C.A. Culp of the Wharton School – author of a leading business school textbook on 
insurance
107 – put the relation between premium rates and accident prevention in the following 
way: 
Finally, a rate may be expected to encourage the reduction 
of loss.  Sound insurance principle requires, however, that this 
objective be kept clearly secondary to those of equity and 
adequacy.  Insurance after all is a device to pool risk and share 
losses. To the extent that the insurer can soundly and fairly 
combine provision of safety incentives with this fundamental 
purpose, very good.  But the condition definitely limits the role of 
the rate as a safety incentive.
108 
 
Admittedly, these are just a few examples of formally published works, not the 
views of insurance executives or agents working out in the field in actual insurance practice.  In 
future work I hope to examine some of the more informal sources reflecting the views of such 
individuals.  But in a sense the views of the scholars and professionals who engaged in formal 
                                                 
105Id. at 35-40. 
106“Rate reductions can be brought about only by reduction in hazard, and definite schedules, allowing rate 
reductions for better than average conditions and requiring penalties for poorer conditions, are in use in some states.  
Insurance rates are modified in accordance with the losses experienced on individual risks.” Id. at 41-42. 
107See C.A. CULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE (1928); C.A. CULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE (2d ed. 1942); C.A. 
CULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE (3d ed. 1956). 
108See C.A. Culp, The Rate-Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance–Goals, Technics, and 
Limits, 15 LAW & CONTEM. PROBLEMS 493, 494 (1950). 
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publication were likely to be more influential on the making of policy and the evolution of 
attitudes toward policymaking than those who worked in the trenches of the insurance business.  
After all, I am concerned here not with the enactment of any particular piece of legislation that 
might have been more influenced by practical considerations than by academic thinking, but 
rather with the evolution of ideas about the relation between liability insurance and accident 
prevention.  Whether or not these ideas originated with legal and insurance scholars, it was in 
their work that the intellectual foundations of change would have been located.  In any event, I 
am reasonably confident that the flavor of my brief survey is substantially accurate.  Those who 
worked in insurance for a living or studied and wrote about the insurance business were aware 
that liability insurance premiums varied with risk levels, but considered the effect of such 
variation on safety to be a secondary concern.  
In short, by about 1960 in both academic circles and in the courts, liability 
insurance was regarded mainly as a method of spreading the risk of loss.  No longer was it 
merely a method by which a potentially liable party obtained the capacity to “meet its 
responsibility” to compensate those it injured.  And the potential in theory for liability insurance 
to promote safety was also recognized by insurance specialists.  But perhaps because there was 
considerable skepticism about the prospects for making use of this capacity, there was no refined 
analysis of the way in which liability insurance premium rating could promote safety, or of the 
way in which the tension between loss spreading and accident prevention played out in practice. 
 Even after enterprise liability theory and insurance law scholarship were fully developed, the 
role played by ideas about liability insurance in tort and tort-reform theory was limited and 
simplistic, in part because enterprise liability was seen so heavily as a method of ensuring the 
compensation of victims by spreading loss in broad channels of distribution.  
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C. The Transition of the 1960's 
It was in the decade of the 1960's that legal scholars began to make the transition 
to a more sophisticated way of thinking about the relation between liability insurance and 
accident prevention.  The principal, though not exclusive, catalyst for this transition was a 
renewed debate about the proper method of handling auto accidents.  Critics of the tort system 
once again noted the series of the flaws in the manner that tort handled auto accidents that the 
COLUMBIA PLAN had identified a generation earlier, and argued that substituting other methods 
of compensating the victims of auto accidents would be a superior approach.
109  The publication 
of Guido Calabresi’s first article after he began teaching occurred at the very beginning of this 
period.  Although the article was not addressed directly to the auto accident problem, it provided 
support for these critics, among other things by laying out a more refined way of analyzing 
arguments for and against enterprise liability than had previously been available.
110 
The first major response to the proponents of auto liability reform came in 1965 
in a book by Blum and Kalven.
111  Their argument consisted heavily of the analysis and criticism 
of the various alternatives to the fault system.  Those proposing alternatives had argued among 
other things that the fault system failed to deter negligent driving, at least in part because of 
widespread insurance against liability.
112  In practice auto liability insurance largely disregarded 
                                                 
109Although there was a growing literature on the problem prior to the mid-1960's, two of the major 
treatments of the problem appeared at mid-decade.  See ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFERY O’CONNELL, BASIC 
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965); ALFRED P. CONARD ET AL., AUTO ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 
(1964). 
110See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 
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individual fault, setting premiums by reference to broad actuarial categories and settling cases 
for reasons of expedience.  To make their argument work, therefore, Blum and Kalven had to 
show that the fault system’s interaction with auto liability insurance did not necessarily doom 
that system. 
Their strategy was to imagine an ideal, alternative way of pricing insurance 
against liability based on fault and to argue that if that ideal were adopted, the fault system 
would  be preferable to the alternatives being proposed to replace it.  They readily recognized 
that, at the time,  “liability insurers in allocating costs among the insured appear to think in strict 
liability terms.”
113  However, instead of following this recognition where it seemed to lead – 
toward some form of non-fault liability -- they argued that it would be better to improve the way 
in which liability insurance was priced so that it did differentiate based on driver fault.
114  In 
view of the secondary importance that we have seen earlier scholars and writers attached to 
premium rating as a method of accident prevention, this was a significant proposal, peculiar 
though it may have been as a way of defending the fault system. 
It was at this point that Calabresi entered the debate, in three articles that presaged 
a number of points that he would develop much further in THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS.  For our 
purposes here, it is sufficient to say that he began in these articles to analyze how the refinement 
and degree of subcategorization of insurance affects the interaction between loss spreading and 
accident reduction.
115  In these pieces he argued that both the existing tort system and tort reform 
                                                                                                                                                             
56 (1965) LEON GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE 77-78 (1959).  
113Id. at 66. 
114Id. at 67-68. 
115See Guido Calabresi, Fault, Accidents, and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L. J. 216, 
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inevitably pursue a mix of goals.  There could be neither maximum accident prevention nor 
maximum loss spreading in systems that pursued both.  These and other, justice-related goals 
would have to be optimized in mixed systems that compromise each goal in service of the proper 
combination of them all.  Criticizing reform proposals, as Blum and Kalven had, on the ground 
that they did not maximize a particular one of these different goals simply ignored the fact that 
loss spreading, accident prevention, and other values are inevitably in tension.  The proper task 
of the tort theorist was to understand how these values interacted and to analyze the 
consequences of the different possible interactions.  The stage was thus set for a full-blown 
analysis of the relation among these values. 
V.  THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS AND THE MODERN ERA OF TORT LAW 
That analysis emerged in 1970, with the publication of  THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS.   At its most general level, the book is about the relation between deterrence and loss 
spreading – between what Calabresi calls primary and secondary accident cost avoidance.
116  He 
was highly critical of the way the fault system pursued these goals and his analysis strongly 
implied that in certain contexts enterprise-based strict liability would be superior.  But he moved 
beyond the limits of the earlier enterprise liability theorists’ thinking by recognizing that liability 
insurance figured not only in the loss spreading function of tort liability but also in the accident 
prevention function, and by identifying contexts in which enterprise liability might and might not 
be the most effective means of achieving these goals.  His economic approach to analyzing the 
problem almost inevitably brought consideration of the relationship between liability insurance 
                                                                                                                                                             
225-32 (1965); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 713, 720-34 (1965); Guido Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident 
Costs?, 33 LAW & CONTEM. PROBLEMS 429, 443-45 (1968). 
116See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS at 26-27. 
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and accident prevention into play. 
Early in the book, Calabresi discussed the different approaches to loss spreading, 
one of which is of course insurance, including liability insurance.
117  In these slightly more than 
a dozen pages, Calabresi developed a framework for thinking about the role that insurance can 
play in mediating between the two somewhat inconsistent goals of tort liability, reducing 
accidents and spreading the costs of those accidents that occur.  Of course the book was about far 
more than liability insurance, which figures directly in the analysis at only a few points.  But as I 
noted earlier, some of the enterprise liability theorists had tended to think of insurance as being 
wholly unrelated to accident prevention; the insurance law scholars had been indifferent to and 
therefore disregarded the relation between liability insurance and tort liability; and although 
insurance professionals understood how insurance premium rating occurred, tort law theory was 
beyond the scope of their interest as well. 
In his discussion of insurance Calabresi brought together a combination of 
insights that were significant advances over earlier thinking about this issue.  He explained how 
it is that the extent to which insurance spreads risk is a function of the degree of differentiation 
among different categories of insureds in the setting of premium rates.
118  The less 
differentiation, the more spreading.  The more differentiation there is, the less loss spreading 
occurs but the greater the potential for accident reduction even though liability for losses is 
insured.
119  He further explained why private insurance may generate what is regarded as 
insufficient loss spreading because of the cost of constructing insurance categories,  people’s 
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118Id. at 47. 
119Id. at 47. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press 
  48 
inability to value risk properly, their lack of incentive to purchase insurance if they have limited 
assets, and different parties’ differential ability to insure.
120   
When this insurance analysis was combined with Calabresi’s more general 
analytical framework, it provided a systematic basis for thinking about the role that liability 
insurance can play in tort law.  In a sense, what Calabresi did was substantially refine and 
advance the conception of liability insurance as a device that was potentially consistent with 
accident prevention that had been absent from tort law thinking since just before the time of 
workers’ compensation.  Because so much of the ongoing debate about tort reform during the 
ensuing years had been concerned with the role that tort might play in filling the injury 
compensation gaps in existing forms of social welfare protection, this conception of liability 
insurance had long been dormant.   But Calabresi reinvigorated it. 
This moment in intellectual history coincided with developments in the world of 
insurance that highlighted the practical importance of  Calabresi’s thought.  Calabresi showed 
that both injurers and victims are potentially in a position to take actions that will contribute to 
accident prevention, and that both injurers and victims are potentially in a position to take 
actions that will spread the losses associated with the accidents that do occur.  But this was not a 
merely theoretical possibility.  By 1970, potential victims were actually acquiring the means of 
becoming effective spreaders of at least some of the costs of accidents.  For example, Medicare 
had been introduced in 1965, and employment-based group health insurance was becoming 
available to a significant portion of the American population.  Given the rise of these and other 
forms of victim-based loss spreading, it is no surprise that accident prevention would come to 
                                                 
120Id. at 59-60. 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art2 
  49 
play a larger role in thinking about tort liability, and that the relation between liability insurance 
and accident prevention would seem more significant than it had during the period when injurer-
based loss spreading had seemed to be the principal means by which this goal might be achieved. 
This change of emphasis was certainly reflected in the mass tort cases that began 
to be filed in the decade after publication of THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS.  Mass tort defendants 
have tended to be large corporate enterprises with a high volume of loss and a statistically 
reliable base of loss experience.  In a mass tort setting the potential defendant’s liability 
insurance premiums are therefore likely to be much more nearly proportional to the degree of 
risk posed by its activities than in the sporadic accident context.  Consequently, the argument 
that the mass tort defendant’s access to insurance would mitigate its accident-prevention 
incentives would tend to be weaker than in most other tort settings.  Conversely, potential 
victims’ access to their own insurance would tend to de-emphasize the loss spreading effect of 
imposing mass tort liability, since both victims and injurers would be at least somewhat adequate 
loss spreaders.   But health insurance and other victims-insurance premiums are not at all 
differentiated with respect to the risk of suffering the kinds of injury or disease associated with 
mass tort.  Consequently, in this respect the accident prevention incentives created by allocating 
costs to victims would likely be minimal.  And potential victims are not nearly as effective 
spreaders of the risk of suffering wage loss as a result of mass torts, because insurance against 
such loss is much less widespread than health insurance.   In short, it is no surprise that as the 
years went on, because of their accident prevention capacities, the injurers in mass tort settings 
were so often considered superior bearers of the risk of loss – “cheapest cost avoiders,” in 
Calabresi’s terms.   And even when they were not, the argument against imposing liability also 
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often was based on the analytical framework that Calabresi had developed.
121 
The rise of mass tort liability thus occurred only after the earlier thinkers’ 
preoccupation with ensuring the compensation of victims was finally displaced by a more 
sophisticated approach that weighed deterrence more heavily and took the availability and 
functioning of insurance into account in that calculus.  The availability of victim insurance 
prompted some commentators, and undoubtedly some courts as well, to focus even more heavily 
on the deterrent effect of the threat of liability, leaving the compensation and loss spreading 
goals to be addressed through victim insurance.
122 
At the same time, the growth of health (and to a lesser extent, disability) 
insurance may well have provided victims with sufficient compensation for the immediate costs 
of injury to enable them to maintain lawsuits that would have been settled in the past.  In this 
sense health and disability insurance may have enhanced the “staying power” of plaintiffs in a 
manner analogous to providing them with access to the capital market to finance their 
lawsuits.
123  Paradoxically, instead of reducing the importance of tort, the growth of these forms 
of insurance may be helping to fuel its expansion. 
Even apart from mass tort issues, subsequent scholarship has built on Calabresi’s 
insights in many ways, and his insights about insurance have been no exception.  For example, in 
a 1985 article, Richard Epstein argued that products liability was a flawed insurance system and 
that many of the losses that products liability imposed on manufacturers would be more 
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effectively insured by victims.
124  Analyzing the tort liability and insurance “crisis” of the mid-
1980's, George Priest contended that liability insurance premiums had skyrocketed (and 
insurance had become completely unavailable for some enterprises) because modern tort liability 
made it impossible for liability insurance accurately to differentiate the premiums charged 
different insureds.
125  I offered my own contribution by extending Calabresi’s insight that 
insurance categories do not always differentiate among insureds in a way that is considered 
collectively desirable.  I showed how insurance categories are fashioned and how insurers’ use 
of these categories can be regulated to help achieve the degree and kind of accident prevention 
and loss spreading that we collectively desire, even when insurers have not done so 
themselves.
126  Moreover, Calabresi’s influence on more recent work in the area has continued to 
be felt.  For example, in a number of articles Jon Hanson has argued the case for enterprise 
liability on the ground that liability insurance has greater potential to create accident prevention 
incentives than  first-party insurance.
127   
CONCLUSION 
We have come a long way since the first forms of liability insurance were 
introduced in this country over a century ago.  The early ideas about the relation between 
liability insurance and accident prevention contained the kernels of modern thought about this 
relation, but they reflected older views regarding the purpose of liability insurance mainly as a 
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method of ensuring the capacity of tort defendants to compensate victims.  During the first half 
of the 20th century the focus on whether and to what extent tort law and its reform should be 
employed to contribute to broad policies of social welfare resulted in increasing emphasis being 
placed on the loss spreading effects of liability insurance.  As different sorts of tort reform were 
proposed and debated, however, the relation between liability insurance and accident prevention 
was given noticeably little attention.  It was not until Guido Calabresi began to write that a full-
blown framework for analyzing this relationship emerged.  That framework has influenced the 
courts and legal scholars for over three decades now, and it continues to organize and affect the 
way we think about the issue.   
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